推动绿色发展，促进人与自然和谐共生，是全面建设社会主义现代化国家的内在要求。钢铁作为国民经济发展和国防建设的重要基础材料，推进钢铁生产的绿色低碳高质量发展已成为钢铁行业的核心使命。充分利用废钢资源发展循环经济，有利于积极推进钢铁生产实现低碳、高效、绿色转型，有利于降低我国铁矿石的对外依存度。

       钢铁供应链具有经济规模大、产业链长、关联产业多等特点，实现钢铁供应链的低碳转型是一项复杂、庞大的系统性工程，实现绿色目标的根本途径在于低碳技术进步，核心是实现技术创新和突破。根据不同阶段国民经济及钢铁工业发展的客观需要，综合技术发展现状，科学统筹谋划，分阶段合理有序地推进钢铁企业绿色转型。由于钢铁工业属于重资产行业，流程优化创新、冶炼工艺突破以及降碳捕集封存技术等都需要投入较高的研发成本，不同势力地位、不同市场预期的企业面对制定低碳发展生产策略时具有差异性。因此，本课题以绿色低碳驱动为背景，以加强废钢利用、提高废钢占比为措施，构建了钢铁企业绿色低碳生产过程的多级供应链决策模型，按照原料采购、生产创新和市场销售的逻辑顺序，逐级递进展开研究，旨在为我国钢铁供应链的绿色低碳高质量发展提供可能的生产创新策略与实施路径。本文主要研究内容包含以下几个方面：

       第一，研究了上游废钢原料品质对钢铁制造供应链博弈策略的影响。构建了由两个不同原料供应商和一个制造商组成的二级供应链，将废钢原料的品质水平作为废钢回收再制造企业的内生变量，碳减排压力是由外部环境和政府政策决定的外生变量。运用多阶段博弈理论分析了外部环保压力对上游的原料质量的要求，铁矿石原料价格和废钢原料价格对竞争系数的敏感性，以及废钢原料质量对整个供应商和制造商利润的影响。然后利用混沌理论建立动态博弈模型，分析了碳减排系数和废钢原料质量水平对整个供应链稳定性的影响。研究发现提升上游废钢原料的质量水平有利于供应链上下游实现共赢，建议给予废钢供应企业一定的鼓励政策和技术投入，更有利于实现废钢回收再制造供应链上下游主体的利润最大化。

       第二，分析了技术创新溢出对钢铁企业绿色创新博弈策略的影响。考虑生产同质产品的两家钢铁企业在生产阶段和市场阶段符合Stackelberg博弈过程，其中创新技术溢出是外生变量。基于领导者-跟随者博弈模型分析技术溢出率对龙头企业及跟随企业的创新投入影响，并综合考虑低碳的环保压力和博弈主体的市场地位异质性，从静态最优博弈和动态重复博弈的角度，建立了完全信息静态博弈模型和有限理性下离散时间的动态博弈模型。对比分析了龙头企业和跟随企业在生产创新阶段竞合博弈策略对企业利润、技术创新投入的影响。基于稳定性理论，对比分析了独立创新模式和合作创新模式下垄断边界点和内部Nash均衡点的稳定域。研究发现适度的溢出率有利于降低生产成本，提高市场销量，而技术溢出超过一定的阈值会导致企业创新积极性降低，不利于经济市场的可持续发展，另外，独立创新模式更有利于提升市场稳定性。

        第三，分析了龙头钢铁企业和相对弱势企业的绿色转型路径的差异。钢铁企业在冶炼过程中加强废钢利用，提升电炉钢比，需要投入大量的研发成本和固定设备成本，市场中的龙头企业和相对弱势企业，在资本势力和行业地位有明显差距，降碳空间和减排能力也有差距。考虑企业在技术创新过程中可以选择不同的技术，建立了两阶段博弈模型，在生产阶段，龙头企业坚持绿色减排技术创新，相对弱势企业经历了从传统技术发展阶段到绿色技术转型阶段，它们分别独立决策各自的技术创新投入；在市场阶段，两企业采取产量竞争，遵循Stackelberg博弈过程。研究发现相对弱势的企业从传统技术发展期到绿色低碳技术阶段转型的最佳时机与外部碳减排压力和技术的成果转化效率相关。本论文探讨了相对弱势企业采取传统冶炼技术创新与低碳技术创新对博弈双方经济效益的影响，最后从长期动态博弈的角度分析了相对弱势企业绿色转型的跃迁路径对整个市场稳定性的影响。

       第四，探究了政府激励政策对钢铁企业绿色低碳创新策略的影响。钢铁行业对政策的补贴策略具有敏感性，尤其是在长期动态博弈过程。考虑政府的激励对企业创新努力的影响，建立了政府和钢铁制造商的三阶段博弈。第一阶段，政府决策对钢铁企业的技术创新补贴率；第二阶段，钢铁企业决策低碳技术创新的研发投入程度；第三阶段，钢铁企业决策钢铁产品的产量。本论文分析了企业创新努力水平和政府补贴率、创新难度的关系，基于社会福利最大化分析政府的最优补贴策略，设计了钢铁企业独立创新研发和合作创新研发不同的模型，对比分析政府的补贴投入和企业的创新努力水平。研究发现，在企业的研发初期，创新难度较大，创新研发成果转化率较低时，政府的激励政策可以正向促进企业提高研发积极性，实现企业利润和社会福利最大化；随着信息技术的发展，企业的创新难度降低，研发创新成功概率的增加，政府可以适当的降低补贴直至不再补贴。

       第五，考虑市场信息不对称对异质预期双寡头博弈策略的影响。绿色低碳钢铁产品市场需求不确定且生产成本更高，因此，建立了具有有限理性异质预期的双寡头利用外推机制预测对手信息的博弈模型。其中，一方采取基于最优反应函数的自适应机制，另一方采用梯度调节机制，并引入外推精度来表示市场参与者预测对手生产信息的准确性。研究了信息不对称对异质双寡头企业的影响，并从静态最优利润和动态平均利润的角度分析了外推精度和调整机制对企业利润的影响。研究发现，合理预测竞争对手的产出信息有利于提高企业的利润和系统稳定性。适度提高外推精度可以抑制一些不良的复杂行为，但是采取自适应调节机制的企业不适合过度提高外推精度，另外，企业生产策略的调整速度比外推机制对利润的影响更大。

Promoting green development and promoting the harmonious co-existence between man and nature is an inherent requirement for building a modern socialist country. Steel is an important basic material for national economic development and national defense construction. It is the core mission of the steel industry to promote the green, low-carbon and high-quality development of steel production. The circular economy of scrap steel is conducive to actively promoting the efficient and green transformation of steel production, and is conducive to reducing the external dependence of China's iron ore.

The steel supply chain has many characteristics, such as large economic scale, long industrial chain and related industries. To realize the low-carbon transformation of the steel supply chain is a complex and huge systematic project, and the fundamental to achieve the green goal is the innovation and breakthrough of low-carbon technology. It is necessary to promote the green transformation of steel enterprises in a reasonable and orderly manner according to the development needs of the national economy and the steel industry at different stages and the status of technological development. Since the iron and steel industry is an asset-heavy industry, process optimization and smelting process breakthroughs require high R&D (research and development) costs. Enterprises with different power positions and different market expectations have different aspects when formulating low-carbon development production strategies. Therefore, this project constructs a multi-level supply chain decision-making model for the green and low-carbon production process of steel enterprises, and achieves green production transformation by increasing the proportion of scrap. The logical sequence of this research is: raw material procurement, production innovation and market sales. The purpose of the research is to provide possible production innovation strategies and implementation paths for the green, low-carbon and high-quality development of Chinese steel supply chain. The main work focuses on the following aspects:

(1) The influence of upstream scrap quality on game strategy of steel manufacturing supply chain is studied. A two-level supply chain consisting of two suppliers and one manufacturer is constructed. The quality of scrap raw materials is regarded as an endogenous variable of scrap recycling and remanufacturing enterprises, and the pressure of carbon emission reduction is an exogenous variable determined by government policies. Game theory is used to analyze the requirements of external environmental pressure on upstream raw material quality, the sensitivity of material price on the competition coefficient, and the influence of scrap raw material quality on the profit supply of the whole supplier and manufacturer. Then a dynamic game model is established using chaos theory to analyze the influence of carbon emission reduction coefficient and scrap quality level on the stability of the whole supply chain. It is found that improving the quality level of upstream scrap raw materials is beneficial to the whole supply chain to achieve a win-win situation. Giving certain incentives to scrap steel suppliers is more conducive to maximizing the profits of the whole scrap steel remanufacturing supply chain.

(2) The influence of technological innovation spillover on green innovation game strategy of steel enterprises is analyzed. This chapter establishes the Stackelberg game model of two steel companies producing homogeneous products, in which the spillover of innovative technology is an exogenous variable. We analyze the impact of technology spillover rate on the innovation investment of leading enterprises and followers, and establish a completely information-static game model and a dynamic game model of discrete time under bounded rationality. The impact of the competition and cooperation game strategy of leading enterprises and following enterprises in the production stage on corporate profits and technological innovation investment was discussed. Based on the stability theory, the stability domains of Nash equilibrium point under independent innovation and cooperative innovation mode are comparatively analyzed. It found that moderate spillover rate is beneficial to reduce production costs and increase market sales. However, when the technology spillover exceeds a certain threshold, it will lead to a decrease in the enthusiasm of enterprises to innovate, which is not conducive to the sustainable development of the economic market. In addition, the independent innovation model is more conducive to improving market stability.

(3) The differentiation of green transformation paths between leading enterprises and relatively weak enterprises is analyzed. In the process of smelting, steel enterprises increase the proportion of scrap steel and increase the electric furnace steelmaking, which needs to invest a lot of research and development costs and fixed equipment costs. Leading enterprises and relatively weak enterprises in the market have obvious gaps in capital power and industry status. In the production stage, the leading enterprises insist on green emission reduction technology innovation, while the relatively weak enterprises have experienced from the traditional technology development stage to the green technology transformation stage, and they independently decide their own technology innovation investment. It is found that the best time for the relatively weak enterprises to transition from the traditional technology development stage to the green and low-carbon technology stage is related to the external carbon emission reduction pressure and the technological achievement transformation efficiency. The influence of traditional smelting technology innovation and low-carbon technology innovation on the economic benefits of both sides of the game is discussed. Finally, from the perspective of long-term dynamic game, the influence of green transition path of different forces of enterprises on the stability of the whole market is analyzed.

(4) A three-stage game model of low-carbon innovation in iron and steel enterprises under government incentive is established. The steel industry is sensitive to the subsidy strategy, especially in the long-term dynamic game process. In the first stage, the government decides the subsidy rate of technological innovation for iron and steel enterprises. In the second stage, steel enterprises decide the R&D investment level of technology innovation; In the third stage, steel enterprises decide the output of steel products. This paper analyzes the relationship between enterprise innovation effort level, government subsidy rate and innovation difficulty, and analyzes the optimal subsidy strategy based on social welfare maximization. Different models of independent innovation R&D and cooperative innovation R&D of iron and steel enterprises are designed, and government subsidy input and enterprise innovation effort level are compared and analyzed. It is found that government incentive policies can positively promote enterprises to improve their enthusiasm for R&D and maximize corporate profits and social welfare in the early stage of R&D. With the development of information technology, the probability of success of R&D innovation increases, and the government can appropriately reduce subsidies until they are no longer subsidized.

(5) A heterogeneous duopoly game model is established based on information asymmetry. Green steel iron products have uncertain market demand and higher production cost. In this paper, one game subject adopts the adaptive mechanism based on the optimal response function, the other adopts the gradient regulation mechanism. The extrapolation precision is introduced to represent the accuracy of market participants in predicting the opponent's production information. The influence of information asymmetry on heterogeneous duopoly is studied, and the influence of extrapolation precision and adjustment mechanism on corporate profit is analyzed from static optimal profit and dynamic average profit. It is found that reasonable prediction of competitors' output information is beneficial to improve corporate profits and system stability. Moderately improving the extrapolation accuracy can restrain some undesirable complex behaviors, but enterprises adopting adaptive adjustment mechanism are not suitable to excessively improve the extrapolation accuracy. In addition, the adjustment speed of production strategy has a greater impact on profits than the extrapolation mechanism.

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